3.400

- (b) The antitrust laws are intended to ensure that markets operate competitively. Any agreement or mutual understanding among competing firms that restrains the natural operation of market forces is suspect. Paragraph (c) below identifies behavior patterns that are often associated with antitrust violations. Activities meeting the descriptions in paragraph (c) are not necessarily improper, but they are sufficiently questionable to warrant notifying the appropriate authorities, in accordance with agency procedures.
- (c) Practices or events that may evidence violations of the antitrust laws include—
- (1) The existence of an *industry price* list or price agreement to which contractors refer in formulating their offers;
- (2) A sudden change from competitive bidding to identical bidding:
- (3) Simultaneous price increases or follow-the-leader pricing;
- (4) Rotation of bids or proposals, so that each competitor takes a turn in sequence as low bidder, or so that certain competitors bid low only on some sizes of contracts and high on other sizes;
- (5) Division of the market, so that certain competitors bid low only for contracts let by certain agencies, or for contracts in certain geographical areas, or on certain products, and bid high on all other jobs;
- (6) Establishment by competitors of a collusive price estimating system;
- (7) The filing of a joint bid by two or more competitors when at least one of the competitors has sufficient technical capability and productive capacity for contract performance;
- (8) Any incidents suggesting direct collusion among competitors, such as the appearance of identical calculation or spelling errors in two or more competitive offers or the submission by one firm of offers for other firms; and
- (9) Assertions by the employees, former employees, or competitors of offerors, that an agreement to restrain trade exists.
- (d) Identical bids shall be reported under this section if the agency has some reason to believe that the bids resulted from collusion.
- (e) For offers from foreign contractors for contracts to be performed out-

- side the United States and its outlying areas, contracting officers may refer suspected collusive offers to the authorities of the foreign government concerned for appropriate action.
- (f) Agency reports shall be addressed to the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530, Attention: Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, and shall include—
- (1) A brief statement describing the suspected practice and the reason for the suspicion; and
- (2) The name, address, and telephone number of an individual in the agency who can be contacted for further information.
- (g) Questions concerning this reporting requirement may be communicated by telephone directly to the Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division.

[48 FR 42108, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 49 FR 12974, Mar. 30, 1984; 50 FR 1727, Jan. 11, 1985; 50 FR 52429, Dec. 23, 1985; 55 FR 25526, June 21, 1990; 65 FR 36030, June 6, 2000; 68 FR 28080, May 22, 2003]

Subpart 3.4—Contingent Fees

3.400 Scope of subpart.

This subpart prescribes policies and procedures that restrict contingent fee arrangements for soliciting or obtaining Government contracts to those permitted by 10 U.S.C. 2306(b) and 41 U.S.C. 254(a).

3.401 Definitions.

As used in this subpart—

Bona fide agency, means an established commercial or selling agency, maintained by a contractor for the purpose of securing business, that neither exerts nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain Government contracts nor holds itself out as being able to obtain any Government contract or contracts through improper influence.

Bona fide employee, means a person, employed by a contractor and subject to the contractor's supervision and control as to time, place, and manner of performance, who neither exerts nor proposes to exert improper influence to solicit or obtain Government contracts nor holds out as being able to obtain